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Abstract: This article draws on the antebellum political thought of Black abolitionists 
Frederick Douglass and Martin Delany in critically assessing the efficacy of 
reasonableness in advancing the aims of emancipatory politics in political discourse. I 
argue, through a reading of Douglass and Delany, that comporting oneself reasonably in 
the face of oppressive ideology can be counterproductive, if one's aim is to undermine 
such ideology and the institutions it supports. Douglass and Delany, I argue, also 
provide us with a framework for evaluating alternative discursive strategies we might 
wish to employ in light of the limited value of reasonableness for emancipatory politics.  
 
[I]f [political] participation means voting, and it means compromise, and organizing and 
advocacy, it also means listening to those who don’t agree with you…. If you disagree with 
somebody, bring them in and ask them tough questions. Hold their feet to the fire. Make them 
defend their positions. If somebody has got a bad or offensive idea, prove it wrong. Engage it. 
Debate it…. Go at them if they’re not making any sense. Use your logic and reason and words. 
Barack Obama, Rutgers Commencement Address1 
                                               
* I would like to thank Borhane Billi Hamelin, César Cabezas, Kimberlé Crenshaw, Manuel 
Käppler, Frederick Neuhouser, Dasha Polzik, Damion Scott, Alexander Rigas, Carol Rovane, 
and Olúfẹmi Táíwò for helpful comments and conversations at various stages of this project. The 
comments of two anonymous reviewers, the editors at Ethics, and my seemingly tireless 
interlocutors-- Robert Gooding-Williams, John Colin Bradley, and Yarran Hominh-- have been 
invaluable. 
1 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at Commencement Address at Rutgers, the State 
University of New Jersey,” May 15, 2016, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2016/05/15/remarks-president-commencement-address-rutgers-state-university-new. 
Fear of Muslims is RATIONAL… the truth fears no questions. 
Michael Flynn, 2/26/16 Tweet2 
1. Introduction  
 In this paper, I aim to articulate some lines of argument, present in the antebellum 
political writings of Frederick Douglass and his fellow Black abolitionist Martin Delany, for the 
claim that participation in reasonable political deliberation can be counterproductive for those 
seeking to advance the aims of emancipatory politics (i.e., politics that seeks to erode or 
eliminate various forms of oppression). I take the target of this claim to be exemplified in 
President Obama's exhortation to use our 'logic, reason, and words' in attempting to advance our 
political aims through reasonable political discourse.  
 The norm of reasonableness in political discourse seeks to secure the provision of equal 
respect to the perspectives of relevant parties in deliberation.3 Reasonable political agents 
provide justifications for their stances which they can expect their interlocutors to endorse, and 
they address their interlocutors' stances by critically engaging the justifications which their 
interlocutors put forth. Thus, for instance, a reasonable interlocutor might address Flynn with 
                                               
2 Michael Flynn, “Fear of Muslims Is RATIONAL: Please Forward This to Others: The Truth 
Fears No Questions...http://Youtu.be/tJnW8HRHLLw,” microblog, @genflynn, (February 26, 
2016), https://twitter.com/genflynn/status/703387702998278144. 
3 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 2005), 49; Iris Marion Young, 
Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 24-25; Jason Stanley, How 
Propaganda Works (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2015), 94.  
evidence (statistical or anecdotal) and arguments to demonstrate the falsity (and indeed 
absurdity) of his claim.4 Emancipation is, in part, a matter of enlightenment.   
 Douglass, I claim, in his July 5th, 1852 speech, “The Meaning of July Fourth for the 
Negro,” (often referred to as ‘The Fifth of July’ speech), rejects this sort of strategy for 
emancipatory politics in political discourse. Before a predominately white Republican audience, 
Douglass declares “where all is plain there is nothing to be argued…. The manhood of the slave 
is conceded.”5 Throughout the speech, Douglass insists that he will not argue that slavery is 
wrong: 
Would you have me argue that man is entitled to liberty? That he is the rightful owner 
of his own body? You have already declared it. Must I argue the wrongfulness of 
slavery? Is that a question for Republicans? Is it to be settled by the rules of logic and 
argument, as a matter beset with great difficulty, involving a doubtful application of the 
principle of justice, hard to be understood? How should I look to-day, in the presence of 
Americans, dividing, subdividing a discourse, to show that men have a natural right to 
freedom? Speaking of it relatively and positively, negatively and affirmatively. To do 
so, would be to make myself ridiculous, and to offer an insult to your understanding.—
                                               
4 The aim of a reasonable political agent need not be to persuade her immediate interlocutor-- 
this, for instance, seems to be neither a prudent nor plausible aim in holding Flynn's feet to the 
fire. Rather, in many instances, we can understand a reasonable political agent as seeking to 
persuade a wider public audience by critically engaging with the justifications her interlocutors 
offer for their views.  
5  "The Meaning of the July Fourth for the Negro,” Frederick Douglass : Selected Speeches and 
Writings (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1999), 195. 
There is not a man beneath the canopy of heaven that does not know that slavery is 
wrong for him.6 
  I think that we should take Douglass’s refusal to argue as a major strand of his 
antebellum political thought.7 Appeals to reasonableness in antebellum US political discourse, 
Douglass and Delany think, enable political actors invested in the maintenance of a white 
supremacist system of racialized slavery to manipulate deliberation in their interests. Such 
political actors do this in two ways. First, they frame claims about the boundaries of moral 
community as ‘open questions’ in need of determination by inquiry, and fix the outcomes of such 
inquiry through the exercise of domination over those they aim to exclude. Second, these 
political actors undermine the standing of Black political actors by maintaining that the latter’s 
standing is dependent on the boundaries of the moral community, so that granting a Black 
political actor standing in deliberation over these boundaries would amount to begging the 
question-- a result that contributes to the reproduction of racist hierarchies even in antebellum 
abolitionist organizations. Participation in reasonable deliberation can be counterproductive for 
                                               
6 Douglass, “The Meaning of the Fourth of July for the Negro,” My Bondage and My Freedom, 
196. Emphasis his.  
7 Ultimately, for reasons of space and interpretive commitment, I don’t wish to claim that this is 
the only position on deliberation that Douglass endorses in the decade leading up to the Civil 
War. My more limited claim is that this is one strategy that Douglass experiments with during 
this period, and, more importantly, that it is one plausible (perhaps compelling) option for 
emancipatory politics today. 
emancipatory politics, because the norm of reasonableness is implicated in the maintenance and 
reproduction of social hierarchies and patterns of oppression.8 
 Contemporary western political theory is not unacquainted with projects of this form.9 
For example, Lynn Sanders, in “Against Deliberation,” suggests that “deliberation should not 
                                               
8 The critique of reasonableness presented here is one synthesized from certain moments in the 
antebellum political writings of Douglass and Delany. To do this properly, we have to get the 
details right—we have to get at what Douglass and Delany said in the pages cited below. But the 
unity of these details is not the result of an intention by Douglass and Delany to offer ‘The 
Douglass-Delany Critique of Reasonableness.’ Rather, the unity is generated ultimately by 
interests animating the emancipatory politics of our own moment. It is important to recognize 
that these interests are distant from, but by no means alien to, those animating the emancipatory 
politics of Black antebellum abolitionists. The critique reconstructed here is for us, but if 
successfully so, it is one that Douglass and Delany could by and large endorse as their own. 
Ultimately, the aim of this paper is to help loosen the grip that certain political commitments 
have on us by showing that some people engaged in politics distant, but not alien, to ours have 
had reason to reject them, and that such commitments are thus options among others. See Robert 
Gooding-Williams, “History of African American Political Thought and Antiracist Critical 
Theory,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Race, ed. Naomi Zack, 2017, 235-45 and 
In the Shadow of Du Bois : Afro-Modern Political Thought in America (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 2009); Paul C. Taylor, “Bare Ontology and Social Death,” 
Philosophical Papers 42, no. 3 (2013): 369–89. 
9 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, esp. 36-50; Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, “Power and 
Reason,” in Deepening Democracy : Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory 
necessarily and automatically appeal to democratic theorists” because “appealing to deliberation, 
or taking it for granted as an appropriate democratic standard, may have a destructive effect.”10 
According to Sanders, the appearance of genuine deliberation can deceive us into “mistakenly 
decid[ing] that conditions of mutual respect have been achieved by deliberators.”11 Genuine 
instances of deliberation (under which conditions of mutual respect have been achieved) abide 
by the norm of reasonableness, so when we encounter an apparent instance of deliberation, we’re 
inclined to think that the parties to deliberation treat one another as reasonable, affording equal 
respect to the each other’s perspective. But the appearance of reasonable deliberation is 
compatible with unreasonableness—with the failure by one party to accord equal respect to the 
perspective of another. The norm of reasonableness can give cover to forces of marginalization 
in a polity.  
 My aim in this paper, however, is to present a critique which implicates reasonableness 
directly in the maintenance of marginalization. Sanders approaches this critique when she 
observes that, when confronted with prejudice in the political sphere, “sometimes, giving reasons 
isn’t anything like the right project and suggesting that the disregarded argue against prejudice or 
discrimination is offensive in and of itself.”12 Indeed, Sanders cites Douglass’ Fifth of July 
                                               
Governance, ed. Archon Fung (New York: Verso, 2003), 237–58; James Johnson, “Arguing for 
Deliberation: Some Skeptical Considerations,” in Deliberative Democracy, ed. Elster, 
Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy (Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 161–84. 
10 Lynn Sanders, “Against Deliberation,” Political Theory 25, no. 3 (1997), 348. 
11 “Against Deliberation,” 349 
12 “Against Deliberation,” 354 
speech in this connection. But Douglass and Delany, I claim, think that the imperative to give 
reasons is not only offensive, but also can compromise the aims of emancipatory politics in 
circumstances of oppression.   
In section two, I situate the relevant conception of reasonableness in the context of liberal 
political theory. In section three, I draw on Douglass and Delany’s antebellum political writings 
in order to identify a critique of this conception of reasonableness and its role in political 
deliberation. In section four, I show how Douglass and Delany diverge in their responses to their 
shared critique: while Douglass thinks that one can advance antislavery politics in antebellum 
US political discourse by declaring one's membership in the moral community, Delany thinks 
that, in a system of deliberation directed toward the maintenance of racialized slavery and white 
supremacy, such declarations cannot be heard but as premises respectful of the norm of 
reasonableness.  
2. Reasonableness and the Aims of Emancipatory Politics13   
 The conception of reasonableness at issue in this paper takes reasonableness as a virtue of 
political discourse not only in substantially just societies, but also in substantially unjust 
societies. On this conception of reasonableness, where we encounter, for instance, an assertion of 
white supremacist ideology, "that this government was... made by white men, for the benefit of 
white men and their posterity forever, and never should be administered by any except white 
men" and that thus "a negro ought not to be a citizen," we ought to take the stage in opposition 
                                               
13 I would especially like to thank two anonymous reviewers for comments that greatly helped to 
clarify this section, and the conception of reasonableness at issue in this paper.  
and marshal arguments in response-- as, for instance, Lincoln does in response to Stephen 
Douglas.14  
 Yet we should note that contemporary liberal political theorists do not generally hold that 
we have a duty to respond to the white supremacist in a reasonable manner. Gutmann and 
Thompson state clearly that "citizens do not have any obligations of mutual respect toward their 
opponents" who advocate for (e.g.) policies of racial or gender discrimination, because such 
policies violate considerations of basic liberty and opportunity, which constrain reasonableness.15  
In particular, opportunity to participate in the deliberative process is typically taken to impose a 
substantial constraint on reasonableness.  For instance, Rawls holds that reasonableness is 
constrained by the criterion of reciprocity, which "requires that when... terms are proposed as the 
most reasonable terms of fair cooperation, those proposing them must also think it at least 
reasonable for others to accept them, as free and equal citizens, and not as dominated or 
manipulated, or under the pressure of an inferior political or social position."16 Where persons 
are compelled to accept terms under conditions of substantial oppression, they are deprived of 
the opportunity to participate in deliberation as free and equal citizens. Moreover, where the 
criterion of reciprocity is breached, basic liberties are typically violated directly: "For what 
reasons can both satisfy the criterion of reciprocity and justify denying to some persons religious 
                                               
14 Abraham Lincoln, “Fourth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Charleston, Illinois. September 
18, 1858,” in The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Roy Basler, Marion Pratt, and 
Dunlap, vol. 3 (New Brunswick: New Jersey, 1953), 145–201. 
15 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, Mass: 
Belknap Press, 1996), 3, 17-18. 
16 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 446. 
liberty, holding others as slaves, imposing a property qualification on the right to vote, or 
denying the right of suffrage to women?"17 If, with many contemporary liberal theorists, we take 
basic liberties and opportunities to constrain the situations in which a duty to reasonableness in 
political discourse obtains, then we can plausibly deny that such a duty obtains in situations in 
which we are confronted with white supremacist views. 
 But the absence of a duty to engage reasonably with white supremacist ideology under 
conditions of substantial oppression does not itself indicate what we should do when confronted 
with such views under such conditions. One answer to this further question is that we in fact 
have a duty not to be reasonable when confronting white supremacist views under conditions of 
substantial oppression, because engaging in reasonable deliberation in such conditions inflicts 
substantial moral harm on those subjected to white supremacist ideology. Entertaining claims of 
inferiority with rigorous argument, even with an eye to refuting them, demeans and disrespects 
members of the community who are targeted by such claims. In part, this is because an implicit 
expression of inferiority is built into the very act of selectively entertaining claims of inferiority: 
members of targeted groups are implied to be inferior insofar as their claim to equality is taken 
as something in need of 'verification,' where the default assumption is that such verification is 
unnecessary.18 The disrespect expressed in such cases is akin to the disrespect expressed in (e.g.) 
discriminatory stop-and-frisk or airport security policies (de jure or de facto)-- an expression of 
                                               
17 Political Liberalism, 447. 
18 We can focus on cases of selectively entertaining claims of inferiority because, in a political 
culture which is minimally democratic, equality is the default assumption. Any context in which 
a question of inferiority is posed is a deviation from this default. This does not imply that 
deviation in a minimally democratic political culture is infrequent.  
inferiority is built into the very act of discriminatory examination, even if one is subsequently 
'cleared' by the examination.19  
 But if the duty not to be reasonable in the face of white supremacist ideology is grounded 
in the disrespect constituted by expressions of inferiority, it is plausibly only pro tanto. If 
engaging in reasonable deliberation in the face of white supremacist ideology can plausibly 
erode or eliminate the conditions under which such ideology flourishes, and thus the conditions 
under which such disrespect arises ubiquitously, the duty not to be reasonable may be 
overridden. One may, for instance, seek to counteract discriminatory immigration policies 
directed (implicitly or explicitly) against Muslims by pointing to data which demonstrates that 
Muslims are no more likely to commit acts of violence than members of other religious groups, 
with an eye towards rendering the Islamophobic arguments advanced by the likes of Flynn 
unpersuasive to other members of the community. Insofar as 'going to the data' in such 
circumstances qualifies as entertaining claims of inferiority-- because in so doing we (perhaps 
implicitly) endorse a conditional like 'If members of a religious group are more likely to commit 
acts of violence than members of other religious groups, then discriminatory security policies 
directed toward members of that religious group are justifiable'--  it is an expression of 
disrespect. But such arguments might seem decisive in deliberation: we know that the data will 
not justify such discriminatory policies, thus that it will undermine Flynn's Islamophobic claims. 
By advancing such arguments, it appears plausible that we will erode the conditions under which 
such disrespect, and connected harms, arise.20   
                                               
19 This is not to say that the wrong in the latter cases is exhausted by the disrespect it expresses. 
20 This is not a case of flatfooted greater good reasoning: the claim is not that, by performing acts 
which constitute one sort of harm, we contribute to a distinct, greater good (or avoid a distinct, 
 The matter at issue in this paper concerns the conditions under which we should, in the 
absence of a duty of reasonableness, nevertheless comport ourselves reasonably in political 
discourse for the sake of advancing emancipatory political aims. The target claim is that we 
should comport ourselves reasonably when engaging with oppressive ideology under conditions 
of substantial oppression, because comporting ourselves reasonably will effectively advance 
emancipatory political aims. The target claim, in essence, takes a stance on the conditions in 
which emancipatory political actors should deem it prudent to act in accord with the norm of 
reasonableness. 
 I take the target claim to be a common (although by no means universal) feature of 
progressive political culture in the US. Obama's remarks quoted above in his Rutgers' 
Commencement Address are directed at student antiracist activists who adopt a 'no platform' 
strategy in response to expressions of white supremacist ideology on campuses. In exhorting 
such activists to use their reason, logic, and words, Obama implies that engaging in reasonable 
deliberation is a productive means for advancing antiracist political aims. Obama's remarks, 
moreover, exemplify a more general attitude toward antiracist and antifascist activists-- on and 
off university campuses-- which urges that those who in engage in such forms of resistance must 
comport themselves in accordance with values of free speech and expression. 
 A commitment to the target claim is not new in progressive political culture in the US.  It 
is reflected, for instance, in the American Civil Liberties Union's defenses of permits for rallies 
and demonstrations held by Nazis and the Ku Klux Klan in the 1930s, which were motivated by 
                                               
greater harm). Rather, the claim is that, by performing acts which constitute a particular sort of 
harm, we contribute to the erosion or elimination of the same, or closely connected, sorts of 
harm.  
not only an abstract commitment to the intrinsic value of free speech, but by a concrete political 
strategy for advancing social justice aims: "The best way to combat their propaganda is in the 
open where it can be fought by counter-propaganda, protest, demonstrations, picketing-- and all 
the devices of attack which do not involve denying their rights to meet and speak."21 If we adopt 
an expansive conception of modes of participating in deliberation-- inclusive of protest and 
propaganda--  then the ACLU's defense of white supremacists' permits exemplifies a 
commitment to reasonableness, because it is supposed that this commitment will advance 
emancipatory political aims. 
 And, indeed, while the Rawlsian per se is not committed to the target claim, Rawls 
himself does seem to express sympathy for the view that reasonableness is effective in advancing 
emancipatory aims-- in particular, in the context of Lincoln's debates over the legitimacy of 
slavery with Stephen Douglas: "Since the rejection of slavery is a clear case of securing the 
constitutional essential of the equal basic liberties, surely Lincoln's view was reasonable (even if 
not the most reasonable), while Douglas's was not.... What could be a better example to illustrate 
the force of public reason in political life?"22 
 To the contrary, however, Frederick Douglass and Martin Delany give us strong reasons 
to think that comporting ourselves reasonably in the face of white supremacy cannot contribute 
                                               
21 Harry Ward et al., “Shall We Defend Free Speech for Nazis in America?” (American Civil 
Liberties Union, October 1934), 3.  http://documents.latimes.com/aclu-asks-1934-shall-we-
defend-free-speech-nazis-america/; Laura Weinrib “The ACLU’s Free Speech Stance Should Be 
about Social Justice, Not ‘Timeless’ Principles,” Los Angeles Times, August 30, 2017, 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-weinrib-aclu-speech-history-20170830-story.html. 
22 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 484. 
productively to emancipatory political aims: reasonable political conduct under conditions of 
substantial oppression can be counterproductive. In their antebellum political writings, Douglass 
and Delany demonstrate that engaging in reasonable deliberation under conditions of substantive 
oppression cannot reliably render white supremacist claims unpersuasive to other members of the 
polity, and more generally cannot contribute to the erosion of conditions of oppression. In fact, 
Douglass and Delany suggest, engaging in reasonable deliberation under conditions of 
substantive oppression is liable to reinforce such conditions. 
 It should be clear, at this stage, that Douglass and Delany do not provide a critique of the 
role of reasonable deliberation in substantially just societies; their arguments are compatible with 
the contemporary liberal theorist's commitment to reasonable deliberation in such circumstances. 
At issue for Douglass and Delany is the role of reasonableness in advancing from conditions of 
substantial oppression toward a substantially just society; in Charles Mills' sense of the term, the 
question is the extent to which the norm of reasonableness figures into a program of corrective 
justice, particularly where the aim is to erode or eliminate white supremacist ideology and 
institutions.23 
 It is also important to note that the model of deliberation which Douglass and Delany 
target does not assume that one's direct interlocutors must be sincere in order for the deliberation 
to qualify as reasonable. Sincere participants in deliberation exhibit the virtue of open-
mindedness: they are open to revision of their stances as dictated by the reasons and evidence 
advanced in a particular deliberative context. But in order for deliberation to qualify as 
reasonable, we needn't assume that the immediate advocates of systems of oppression are 
                                               
23 Charles W. (Charles Wade) Mills, Black Rights/White Wrongs : The Critique of Racial 
Liberalism (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017), esp. chs. 8 & 9. 
sincere, open-minded interlocutors. Rather, we must assume that the audience-- the wider public-
- is generally composed of sincere, open-minded interlocutors. Thus, we needn't imagine that 
those striving to advance emancipatory aims by means of reasonable deliberation sought to 
persuade Stephen Douglas (or seek to persuade Michael Flynn). We should rather understand the 
goal for proponents of the target claim as persuading members of the wider public to endorse and 
advance emancipatory aims.24 Douglass and Delany give us strong reasons to think that not only 
the former sort of project is futile (with which many proponents of the target claim would agree), 
but that the latter sort of project, directed at persuading the public, is also untenable.   
3. A Critique of Reasonableness in Emancipatory Politics 
 In the letter prefacing his 1855 autobiography, My Bondage and My Freedom, Frederick 
Douglass invokes the image of a court of law to characterize the political situation around 
American slavery: 
[T]his system [i.e., chattel slavery] is now at the bar of public opinion—not only of this 
country, but of the whole civilized world—for judgment. Its friends have made for it the 
usual plea—‘not guilty;’ the case must, therefore, proceed. Any facts, either from 
slaves, slaveholders, or by-standers, calculated to enlighten the public mind, by 
revealing the true nature, character, and tendency of the slave system, are in order, and 
can scarcely be innocently withheld.25 
                                               
24 I do assume, then, that we can attribute some degree of sincerity (i.e., some degree of open-
minded responsiveness to reasons) to the wider public in the relevant deliberative contexts.   
25 Frederick Douglass, My Bondage and My Freedom (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1987), 4. 
Douglass’s invocation of a court of law suggests that the norm of reasonableness is operative in 
this political discourse. The legitimacy of slavery is an open question before ‘the bar of public 
opinion,’ awaiting judgment; those seeking to establish its ‘guilt,’ or ‘innocence,’ must 
‘enlighten the public mind’ by demonstrating the ‘true nature… of the slave system.’  
Yet Douglass goes on to observe that the institution of slavery is not the only matter up 
for deliberation: “Not only is slavery on trial, but unfortunately, the enslaved people are also on 
trial.”26 The human dignity of Black people appears as a matter for deliberative inquiry because 
it is implicated in the justifications slavery’s advocates advance in defense of the institution: “It 
is alleged, that they are, naturally, inferior; that they are so low in the scale of humanity, and so 
utterly stupid, that they are unconscious of their wrongs, and do not apprehend their rights.”27 In 
order to qualify as reasonable, those who invoke white supremacist ideology in defense of chattel 
slavery must concede such claims as open questions to be resolved through deliberation. To 
understand a claim as an open question is to recognize that deliberation might confirm or refute 
the claim. In turn, antislavery's advocate, if they are to comport themselves reasonably, must 
critically engage white supremacist justifications of slavery on terms that she can plausibly 
expect the wider public—if not slavery’s advocate herself— to endorse. 
It is precisely this sort of emancipatory political strategy that Douglass takes aim at in his 
Fifth of July speech: 
But I fancy I hear some one of my audience say, it is just in this circumstance that you 
and your brother abolitionists fail to make a favorable impression on the public mind. 
                                               
26 My Bondage and My Freedom, 4. 
27 My Bondage and My Freedom, 4. 
Would you argue more, and denounce less, would you persuade more and rebuke less, 
your cause would be much more likely to succeed.28 
Douglass, in this speech, maintains that “where all is plain there is nothing to be argued:” “That 
point is conceded already. Nobody doubts it.... The manhood of the slave is conceded.” He 
denies that reasonableness (‘argue more, denounce less’) is of use to antislavery politics when 
confronting putative justifications for the legitimacy of slavery. It is not the ‘light’ of 
“convincing argument” that is needed, but the “fire” of “scorching irony.”29 The humanity of the 
enslaved, and the wrongness of slavery, are matters to be insisted, not deliberated, upon; open 
questions about the human dignity of Black people ought to be refused.  
In Douglass’ position that, on the issues of slavery and white supremacy, all is plain and 
there is nothing to be argued, we can distinguish two elements: (1) a refusal to respect the norm 
of reasonableness in political discourse about the (il)legitimacy of slavery and white supremacy 
and (2) a declaration that Black people are members of the moral community of the US polity. In 
this section, we will focus on the grounds for (1), drawing in complementary fashion on the 
antebellum political writings of Douglass’s fellow Black abolitionist, Martin Delany. In the 
antebellum writings of Douglass and Delany, we can identify two reasons for the refusal to 
engage in reasonable deliberation. First, by appeal to the norm of reasonableness, defenders of 
slavery and white supremacy are able to fix deliberative outcomes in their favor: where a stance 
on the boundaries of moral community is understood as a claim in need of justification, those 
invested in systems of slavery and white supremacy can exercise their power to reliably produce 
justifications for exclusionary boundaries of moral community—conditions of domination 
                                               
28 “The Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro,” 195 
29 “The Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro,” 195-96 
produce justifications for claims of inferiority. Second, where the boundaries of moral 
community are an open question, advocates of slavery and white supremacy can compromise the 
standing of those whose claim to membership is under interrogation (i.e., Black political actors) 
by insisting that granting Black political actors standing in such deliberations would amount to 
begging the question in favor of more expansive boundaries of moral community. As we will 
see, this is a ‘worry’ to which even white abolitionists were responsive.  
a. Fixing Deliberative Outcomes 
      Given the picture of antebellum political discourse that Douglass sketches in the letter 
prefacing My Bondage and My Freedom, we can take Douglass's refusal to engage in reasonable 
deliberation in the Fifth of July speech to center appeals to white supremacist ideology: Douglass 
refuses to refute the claim that Black people are inferior, and thus not members of the moral 
community, by addressing the justifications that slavery's advocate advances in defense of the 
claim. Douglass refuses to do so (in part) because he thinks that once the dispute is framed as a 
matter of competing justifications, slavery's advocates will be able to exercise the power they 
wield under conditions of substantial oppression to fix deliberative outcomes in their favor. As 
an initial motivation for Douglass's refusal, we might observe that comporting ourselves 
reasonably in the face of white supremacist ideology “risk[s] conferring unmerited dignity” upon 
the “transparently bad reasons [whites] had for the way they treated blacks,” by “tacitly 
characterizing the conflict as one in which reasonable people could disagree.”30 
                                               
30 Myers, Frederick Douglass, 50; Bernard Boxill, “Douglass Against the Emigrationists,” in 
Frederick Douglass: A Critical Reader, ed. Bill Lawson and Frank Kirkland (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 1999), 42. 
Yet, one may insist, if the reasons marshaled in defense of white supremacist ideology by 
slavery’s advocate are really ‘transparently bad,’ the danger that reasonableness presents to 
antislavery politics must surely be minimal. Premises in general may lead any which way, but 
here the proper premises will surely vindicate abolition. With some patience and persistence, the 
right arguments will carry the day for antislavery’s advocate in the deliberative sphere. (Our 
objector would hasten to add: this is not to say that the aims of antislavery politics are achieved 
once the arguments succeed—slavery’s advocate would still have brute force and power to 
protect the institution.) 
A substantial portion of Martin Delany’s The Condition, Elevation, Emigration, and 
Destiny of the Colored People of the United States is devoted to undermining just this thought. 
Delany maintains that African Americans31 have a “natural claim upon the country—claims 
common to all others of our fellow citizens—natural rights, which may, by virtue of unjust laws, 
be obstructed, but never can be annulled.”32 Delany’s contrast between obstruction and 
annulment might seem to suggest our objector’s view: once the obstructions of transparently bad 
reasons are cleared away, African Americans’ claim to citizenship will be vindicated—indeed, 
there is nothing that could be offered as an adequate justification for annulling this claim. 
Yet Delany goes on to contrast this natural claim with the procedure of political 
deliberation: “But according to the economy that regulates the policy of nations, upon which 
rests the basis of justifiable claims to all freemen’s rights, it may be necessary to take another 
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32 Martin Delany, The Condition, Elevation, Emigration, and Destiny of the Colored People of 
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view of, and enquire into the political claims of colored men.”33 Rights presented as political 
claims must, on the view with which Delany engages, must be ‘justifiable’—they must be 
presented in terms that one might reasonably expect one’s interlocutors to endorse. 
The justification for African Americans’ political claim to citizenship that Delany considers 
is “that each person so endowed, shall have made contributions and investments in the 
country.”34 Since “where there is no investment there can be but little interest” in the welfare of 
the state, the question of “what claims then have colored men, based upon the principles set 
forth, as fundamentally entitled to citizenship”35 is to be settled by a demonstration of the 
contributions made by African Americans to the United States, as soldiers, businesspeople, 
mechanics, authors, artists, professionals, scholars, and farmers. By enumerating dozens of 
examples of these contributions, Delany means “to refute the objections urged against us, that we 
are not useful members of society.”36 In these hundred-some pages of Condition (nearly half the 
text!), then, we can understand Delany as rehearing a justification for African Americans’ claim 
to citizenship. These pages exemplify the deliberative norm of reasonableness, as Delany seeks 
to refute the objections of those who deny this claim by appeal to a principle (‘contribution to the 
nation’) that he expects his interlocutors would endorse, and which he establishes by appeal to 
‘marks and features’—historical evidence of Black people’s ‘investment’ in the US.37 Indeed, 
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37 Cora Diamond, in her reading of J.M. Coetzee's The Lives of Animals, encourages us to "look 
with some serious puzzlement at attempts to establish moral community, or to show it to be 
Delany suggests that the argument he presents here must, if any argument will, vindicate African 
Americans’ claim to citizenship: 
If such evidence of industry and interest, as has been exhibited in the various chapters 
on the different pursuits and engagements of colored Americans, do not entitle them to 
equal rights and privileges in our common country, then indeed, is there nothing to 
justify the claims of any portion of the American people to the common inheritance of 
Liberty.38 
But, Delany thinks, this in fact amounts to a demonstration that there is no viable possibility 
of furthering antislavery’s political aims through reasonable deliberation. At the conclusion of 
his defense African Americans’ political claim to citizenship, Delany signals a shift in gears: 
“We proceed to another view of our condition in the United States.”39 That view takes as its 
point of departure the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which Delany reproduces in full. The Act, in 
Delany’s analysis, reduces “every colored person in the United States—save those who carry 
free papers of emancipation, or bills of sale from former claimants or owners—to a state of 
                                               
absent, through attention to ‘marks and features.'" The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of 
Philosophy,” in Philosophy and Animal Life, ed. Stanley Cavell (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2008), 86 endnote 21  
38 Condition, 145  
39 Condition, 145. This second reference to "another view" should recall Delany’s initial shift, in 
Chapter VI, to consideration of “another view”—the political claim defended in the intervening 
pages. With these parallel references to alternative views, we can understand Delany as stepping 
in to and out of the position of the antislavery advocate who attempts to pursue her politics by 
comporting herself reasonably in the deliberative sphere. 
relative slavery; placing each and every one of us at the disposal of any and every white who 
might choose to claim us, and the caprice of any and every upstart knave bearing the title of 
‘Commissioner.”40 By legally codifying relations of domination between whites and Blacks that 
are fundamentally incompatible with Black people’s claim to citizenship, the Act reveals that 
Black people’s claim to citizenship has not been vindicated at the bar of public opinion. Since 
the facts that Delany has laid out in the prior hundred pages of Condition should, if any facts 
could, justify such a claim to citizenship, the implication is that no justification which appeals to 
facts in this way—as ‘marks and features’ that satisfy some criterion for the boundaries of moral 
community—could vindicate the claim to citizenship of Black people in antebellum political 
discourse.41  
This echoes Douglass’s thought when he asks of his audience in the Fifth of July speech: 
“Is it not astonishing that,” given the types of contributions Delany enumerates in Condition, “we 
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41 This, surely, is not the only purpose of the detailed descriptions of African Americans’ various 
contributions to the US polity in the first hundred pages of Condition.  It seems plausible that one 
other purpose is to demonstrate the viability of Delany’s emigrationist program: that Black 
people in the US are already perfectly positioned to create their own polity, or contribute to 
another, elsewhere.  
are called upon to prove that we are men?”42 From Douglass’s explicit refusal to deliberate over 
the boundaries of moral community, and from Delany’s demonstration of the inadequacy of 
‘marks and features’ justifications for the claim to citizenship, it is apparent that Douglass does 
not mean that such a proof is so obvious that it should be tedious to spell out. Rather, Douglass 
suggests that, where the claim in question should be so clearly and plainly settled, we should be 
suspicious of a demand for ‘proof.’  
Delany reinforces this suspicion by identifying the role that reasonableness itself plays in 
compromising antislavery politics responsive to the norm. At the outset of Condition, he asserts 
that “there have in all ages, in almost every nation, existed a nation within a nation... deprived of 
equal privileges by their rulers.”43 In order for such domination to be effective, the “inferiority 
by nature as distinct races” of the dominated must be “actually asserted” in order “to appease the 
opposition that might be interposed on their behalf.”44 That is, natural inferiority is offered as a 
justification for domination in the face of objections to the legitimacy of that domination. On this 
picture, the dominating class is responsive to the norm of reasonableness, because it is providing 
a justification for its stance in the face of a counterclaim. 
One would think, then, that the justificatory priority between cases arbitrary rule and 
assertions of natural inferiority works in this way: claims of natural inferiority, ‘established’ (in 
whatever tenuous fashion) on independent grounds, are put forward to legitimate instances of 
arbitrary rule. Yet, Delany’s analysis of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 suggests that the 
relationship between arbitrary rule and assertions of natural inferiority is more sinister. 
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According to Delany, the law enacts a “corruption of blood… by which a person is degraded and 
deprived of rights common to the enfranchised citizen.”45 In particular, the law renders “the 
colored people of the United States… liable at any time, in any place, and under all 
circumstances, to be arrested—and upon the claim of any white person, without the privilege, 
even of making a defense, sent into endless bondage.”46 The specific policy laid out in the law 
reinforces conditions of domination under which any Black person is subject to the arbitrary 
power of any white person. But in so doing, Delany maintains, the law “stamps us with 
inferiority—upon us has this law worked corruption of blood.”47 The political condition of 
domination produces relations of superiority/inferiority between racialized classes of persons—
the appearance of natural inferiority depends upon the political domination it is supposed to 
justify. 
But this circular relation between political domination and natural inferiority does not, in 
Delany’s eyes, provide antislavery’s advocate with a decisive point in deliberation. Rather, the 
interlocking character of conditions of political domination and claims of natural inferiority 
renders both impervious to the modes of intervention offered by reasonable deliberative politics: 
political domination is justified by claims of natural inferiority which are in turn justified by 
appeal to conditions that are themselves the product of racist political domination. Elizabeth 
Anderson captures this interlocking character in a postbellum context when she writes: 
“Segregation causes patterns of racial inequality that influence the ways racial groups represent 
one another. These representations, in turn, reinforce practices of segregation and reproduce 
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categorical inequality.”48 The deck is stacked against antislavery’s advocate because an attempt 
to delegitimize racist political domination runs up against the justification of inferiority, while an 
attempt to refute a claim of inferiority runs up against the reality of racist political domination. 
 Thus, in laying out his general theory of racist political domination, Delany remarks with 
poignant ambiguity, “Wherever there is arbitrary rule, there must be, on the part of the dominant 
classes, superiority be assumed.”49 The line suggests two readings. First, where a dominant class 
wields arbitrary power over another class, and takes themselves to do so legitimately, they must 
suppose that they are superior—assertions of inferiority justify domination. Second, where a 
dominant class wields arbitrary rule, its members seize a position of superiority over the 
dominated classes—domination yields the appearance of inferiority. I think that Delany’s 
ambiguity here is intentional: the ambiguity captures the interlocking character of domination 
and claims of inferiority. The preceding lines of Chapter I capture the domination justified by 
inferiority direction; Delany’s analysis of the Fugitive Slave Act in Chapter XVI as enacting a 
‘corruption of blood’ captures the inferiority justified by domination direction. It thus seems that 
the interests of white supremacy and slavery will carry the day, because they will exercise 
domination to produce the appearance of inferiority, which will justify their narrowed boundaries 
of moral community before the court of public opinion.  
One might object to the inevitability of this picture. After all, can’t advocates of 
emancipatory politics point out that appearances of inferiority are just so—and often pretty 
flimsy ones at that? And if the appearances of inferiority are the products of domination, can’t 
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we point to this fact to undermine claims of inferiority? There are still plenty of deliberative 
avenues available to antislavery’s advocate. 
Such avenues are certainly available, but this picture is a far cry from the decisive 
argument that unequivocally demonstrates Black people’s claim to moral community. We now 
have to unveil particular claims of inferiority as products of particular conditions of domination. 
While some piecemeal engagements will be won, others will be lost. Moreover, even the 
victories of antislavery’s advocate are rendered precarious by reasonableness’ command to 
follow the premises where(ever) they take us. This command forces us to countenance the idea 
that the right premises might take us elsewhere. An audience which allows that an argument for 
the rightness of slavery and white supremacy might be just offstage is not an audience that can 
be relied upon in the face of fire. Sophistry is the cheapest weapon in the arsenal of oppressive 
institutions.  
b. Undermining Standing 
It is apparent, then, that adhering to norm of reasonableness can compromise 
emancipatory politics by enabling oppressive institutions to fix deliberative outcomes through 
domination which produces the appearance of inferiority, and which is then appealed to in order 
to justify those very conditions of domination. But Douglass and Delany also maintain that 
reasonableness can compromise antislavery and antiracist politics by undermining the standing 
of Black political actors in political deliberation. In particular, they emphasize how the standing 
of Black political actors is undermined even in abolitionist organizations. 
Of the abolitionists’ creed, Delany remarks: “It was urged, and it was true, that the 
colored people were susceptible of all that the whites were, and all that was required was to give 
them a fair opportunity, and they would prove their capacity… that public opinion could and 
should be corrected upon this subject.”50 But Delany observes that the result of this project of 
correcting public opinion through ‘proof’ of capacity (i.e., of establishing membership in the 
moral community through the demonstration of the proper marks and features) is that: 
[W]e find ourselves occupying the very same position in relation to our Anti-Slavery 
friends, as we do in relation to the pro-slavery part of the community—a mere 
secondary, underling position, in all our relations to them, and any thing more than this, 
is not a matter of course affair—it comes not by established anti-slavery custom or 
right, but like that which emanates from the proslavery portion of the community, by 
mere sufferance.51 
Unsurprisingly, such organizations fail to achieve the emancipatory ends that they pursue: “We 
are…still occupying a miserable position in the community, wherever we live.”52 Here Delany 
links the persistence of social relations of racist domination, even in organizations dedicated to 
their eradication, to a conception of politics centered on proof and demonstration—a politics that 
is thereby responsive to the norm of reasonableness.  
Douglass offers insight into the mechanics of this recapitulation of racist hierarchies in 
Chapter 23 of My Bondage and My Freedom. Joining the ranks of William Lloyd Garrison’s 
antislavery lecturers, Douglass finds that his audiences view him as “brand new fact,” “generally 
introduced as a ‘chattel,’—a ‘thing’—a piece of southern ‘property’—the chairman assuring the 
audience that it could speak.”53 One might expect that Douglass’s fellow white abolitionists 
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would affirm Douglass’s standing as a participant in public discourse on slavery. Instead, the 
white abolitionists opt to make use of audiences’ objectification of Douglass, and deploy him as 
a mere body of testimony, instructing Douglass to “[g]ive us the facts, [for] we will take care of 
the philosophy.”54 Where antislavery politics respects the norm of reasonableness by seeking to 
correct public opinion through demonstrations of equality, Douglass’s role is circumscribed to 
narrative.  
Douglass is, for a time, reduced to a body of testimony on the antislavery lecture circuit 
because he is positioned to fulfill a particular role in a deliberative context in which the matter is 
an open question. This particular role, the furnishing of marks and features to which the 
arguments of antislavery’s white advocates will appeal,55 compromises Douglass’ capacity to 
participate in deliberative politics, insofar as his white interlocutors treat the categories of 
offering narrative and doing philosophy as mutually exclusive in this context. The acceptance of 
one’s narrative as legitimate depends on one’s incapacity to philosophize: one can be either the 
body of testimony or the eloquent advocate, but not both.  
But why would one treat narrative and argument as exclusive categories here? Arguments 
before the court of public opinion must be made by those who have appropriate standing to make 
them; in this case, those who have appropriate standing are those who are situated within the 
boundaries of moral community. But Douglass’s claim to moral community is precisely what is 
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being contested in deliberation over slavery, which means that his standing to advance arguments 
in the antebellum deliberative sphere appears, to much of his audience, uncertain. In the eyes of 
the white abolitionists who instruct Douglass to leave the philosophy to them, for Douglass to 
advance arguments against slavery would render the abolitionists vulnerable to accusations of 
begging the question: Douglass’s arguments should be countenanced only if he has the standing 
to make them, but his standing is precisely the matter at issue, so his audience can’t countenance 
Douglass’s arguments until the issue has been resolved. Narrative and argument thus become 
exclusive categories because it is the narrative of those subjected to slavery and white supremacy 
that is needed to advance antislavery and antiracism in the deliberative sphere, but, if the 
abolitionists are going to be ‘reasonable’ deliberators, it is only those who cannot supply the 
narrative (whites) who can advance the argument without being accused of begging the 
question.56  
Narrative and argument are not only treated by the white abolitionists Douglass works 
with as exclusive categories, but narrative is understood to be subordinate to argument. 
Douglass's narrative provides the raw materials which the white abolitionists' arguments 
organize. This hierarchical division of discursive labor lays the groundwork for a broader 
hierarchical division of labor in predominately white abolitionist organizations, as the white 
abolitionists, whose recognized standing in the community is secure, take on overarching 
organizational roles in these organizations. Because such organizations incorporate the same 
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racialized hierarchies they are supposed to resist, their capacity to erode (much less eliminate!) 
white supremacist ideology and institutions is severely circumscribed. 
Douglass and Delany thus argue that reasonable deliberation is counterproductive for the 
aims of emancipatory politics because: (1) slavery's advocate is able to exploit a connection 
between claims of inferiority and conditions of domination in order to systematically manipulate 
the judgments of the court of public opinion in her favor; (2) worries about whether their 
audience will recognize the standing of Black political actors moves white abolitionists to 
structure their discursive strategies, and organizations, in ways reflective of white supremacist 
ideology, severely circumscribing their efficacy. The urgent question, if comporting oneself 
reasonably under conditions of substantive oppression is counterproductive in this way, is how, 
if at all, the aims of emancipatory politics can be advanced in political discourse.  
4. Douglass and Delany: Two Responses to the Critique 
 In response to their shared critique of reasonable deliberation as a means for combating 
racist ideology and institutions, Douglass and Delany offer radically different prescriptions. For 
Douglass, because the norm of reasonableness is a condition of demanding change in antebellum 
political deliberation, the key is to short-circuit the norm where it compromises antislavery 
politics. Douglass presents the demand at the core of antislavery—recognition of Black people’s 
membership in the moral community—through declaration, impervious to demands for further 
justification, without abdicating a general responsibility to reasonableness in deliberation.57 For 
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Delany, because the norm of reasonableness is a condition of demanding change in antebellum 
political deliberation, antislavery cannot advance its aims in this sphere. Douglass’s declarations, 
Delany thinks, will inevitably be heard by his audience as justifications open to further 
assessment and dispute. Delany maintains that the norm of reasonableness is so entrenched in the 
institution of antebellum political deliberation, especially as expressed in white Americans’ 
esteem for law, that declaration cannot be understood by Douglass’s audience as reflecting the 
logic of the institution—a viable antislavery politics thus must pursue strategies in other spheres.  
a. Douglass’s Declarations 
Douglass’s strategy in the Fifth of July speech is to seize upon the mechanisms that tilt 
deliberation in favor of slavery’s advocate, and show that recognition of the slave’s membership 
in moral community is conceded in the very exercise of these mechanisms: 
Must I undertake to prove that the slave is a man? That point is conceded already. 
Nobody doubts it. The slaveholders themselves acknowledge it in the enactments of 
laws for their government. They acknowledge it when they punish disobedience on the 
part of the slave. There are seventy-two crimes in the state of Virginia, which, if 
committed by a black man, (no matter how ignorant he be), subject him to the 
punishment of death; while only two of these same crimes will subject a white man to 
the like punishment. What is this but the acknowledgement that the slave is a moral, 
intellectual, and responsible being? The manhood of the slave is conceded. It is 
admitted in the fact that southern statute books are covered with enactments forbidding, 
under severe fines and penalties, the teaching of the slave to read or write.58 
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The laws that Douglass refers to in this passage are part of the system of racist domination that, 
in Delany’s words, debases Black people “beneath the level of the recognised basis of American 
citizenship.”59 Take, for instance, anti-literacy laws: the domination exercised in inhibiting the 
literacy of slaves enables slavery’s advocate to appeal to the apparent intellectual inferiority of 
the slave (‘They aren’t our equals; they can’t read.’). Indeed, such laws can distract from the 
plain fact that slaves can read and write—the issue can easily become that such skills were 
gained ‘illegally,’ rather than the plain fact to which their skills testify (as if these abilities were 
witnesses in a trial that had to conform to rules of evidence). Similarly, a regime of racist 
criminal laws and the severe punishments that accompany it can give the appearance, to a white 
audience with the right interests, that there is something from which they need protecting. 
Blackness is asserted as inferior because it bears the marks of criminality, through laws which 
are in fact constitutive of the system of domination to which Black people are subjected—what 
Delany calls ‘corruption of blood.’60 
Douglass, in the passage above, turns all this on its head. Contrary to the reasonable 
antislavery advocate, who will insist that Black people meet the criterion of moral community in 
spite of the apparent marks and features produced by corruption of blood, Douglass maintains 
that antislavery’s point is conceded in the laws themselves, and that there is thus no need to 
argue that “the slave is a man” through any appeal to ‘true’ marks and features. In preventing 
people from learning to read and write, one necessarily acknowledges their capacity to read and 
write; in subjecting people to punishment for the violation of laws, one necessarily acknowledges 
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their capacity to bear moral responsibility. The aim of these practices may be dehumanization, 
but one can only attempt to dehumanize one’s fellow human beings. Such laws, implicated in the 
corruption of blood that undermines the standard ‘reasonable’ antislavery strategy, thus 
themselves concede antislavery’s stance on the boundaries of moral community.  
Slavery’s advocate, of course, can object to the characterization of anti-literacy laws as 
‘preventing’ the exercise of a capacity in this way, or reject a conception of punishment that 
implicates moral agency in this way. That is to say, she can object to the justification that 
Douglass supplies for his claim that “the manhood of the slave is conceded.” It then seems that, 
in order to conform to the norm of reasonableness, Douglass must supply further argument to 
defend his characterization of antebellum law as inhibiting and punishing slaves in a way that 
concedes their membership in moral community. Such a defense would involve asserting that 
slaves have capacities which are being inhibited and agency which warrants punishment—but 
then the whole thing seems to come down marks and features again. 
Instead, Douglass plainly declares that “it is enough to affirm the equal manhood of the 
Negro race.”61 While he gestures to an appeal to marks and features relevant to moral community 
by enumerating a list of practices, from planting to writing to thinking to worshiping, in which 
Black people undeniably engage, he maintains that “[t]he time for such argument has passed.”62 
Instead, in the realm of political discourse, antislavery advocates should rely on the fact that 
“[t]here is not a man beneath the canopy of heaven that does not know that slavery is wrong for 
him.”63  
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That every person sees that slavery is wrong for her, and that every person thus sees that 
she is a member of the moral community, suggests to Douglass that those in the court of public 
opinion “have a sense of justice, though they may not consult it often and appropriately.”64 This 
grounds, for Douglass, a discursive strategy which aims at the recovery of moral common sense. 
Douglass often appeals to common sense in order to ground his political critiques, particularly in 
the context of law. Of Scott v. Sanford, he remarks: “We can appeal from this hell-black 
judgment of the Supreme Court, to the court of common sense and common humanity.”65 And in 
advocating for an antislavery reading of the US Constitution, Douglass maintains that “the 
constitutionality of slavery can be made out only by disregarding the plain and common-sense 
reading of the Constitution.”66 These appeals to common sense are meant to combat what 
Douglass calls the “moral blindness of the American people.”67 Douglass’s reference to ‘moral 
blindness’ suggests that what it is at issue is a matter of insensitivity on the part of his audience; 
the shape of the intervention involves making his audience sensitive to something already 
present to them.68 Two characteristics of common sense make it a strong candidate for grounding 
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a transition from insensitivity to sensitivity. First, we can understand common sense as 
“insurgent,” persisting in the absence of recognition by Douglass’s audience.69 Second, we can 
understand common sense as “the domain of simple, quotidian determinations and basic moral 
precepts, of truths that should be self-evident to all,” and thus plainly accessible to Douglass’s 
audience.70  
As a matter of common sense, one is brought to “see the plain moral truth” that anti-
literacy laws inhibit the capacities of slaves and that laws with severe punishments ascribe moral 
agency to those subjected to them.71 This contrasts with the mode of deliberative inquiry, on 
which Douglass would inquire after what the law says and its empirical effects, determine 
through this inquiry that the law inhibits capacities, and then infer that those who are being 
inhibited by the law are members of the moral community because the capacities which the law 
inhibits fall under the criterion of membership in moral community. Instead, if acknowledging 
that anti-literacy laws inhibit capacities and that Black people are members of the moral 
community are matters of moral common sense, one comes to such acknowledgement all at 
once. In order to understand anti-literacy laws as inhibiting the capacities of slaves one must 
already recognize slaves as members of the moral community, and the recognition of slaves as 
members of the moral community is itself achieved through recognizing, for instance, anti-
literacy laws as inhibiting the capacities of slaves. The idiom of ‘coming to see’ (or ‘cultivating 
sensitivity’) contrasts with a process of piecewise inference. Whereas the latter is a matter of 
coming to discover further things, the former is a matter of coming to acknowledge something 
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already present. Acknowledgement here involves a shift in attitude in which one becomes 
sensitive to anti-literacy laws as inhibiting, rather than a shift in which one discovers that anti-
literacy laws turn out to be the sort of thing that inhibit capacities of those subject to them, as if 
this were some further fact about anti-literacy laws which one could intelligibly deny while still 
having a grip on what anti-literacy laws are and how one goes about enforcing them. The failure 
here is not rectified by supplying further facts; it is rectified by bringing one to see things as they 
already are.72  
According to Boxill, Douglass catalyzes this recovery of moral common sense through a 
project of moral suasion:  
Sometimes, with our connivance, our feelings enable us to ignore that we are acting for 
transparently bad reasons. Moral suasion involves techniques for manipulating these 
feelings and consequently for redirecting our attention to the obvious errors that we 
contrive not to see. Such techniques include eloquence, sarcasm, wit, mockery, and 
mimicry, and in the pacific part of his career as orator and abolitionist Douglass used 
them all to try to embarrass and shame his audiences and to manipulate their feelings to 
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make them see the plain moral truths that their pride and greed and vanity had enabled 
them to ignore.73 
I would add that, in light of Douglass’s critique of reasonableness, it is not just matters of 
‘feeling’ that are understood to interfere in recognition of plain moral truths, but also matters of 
reason. (‘We need to figure out if those people satisfy these criteria.’) Moral suasion is thus not 
an intervention against irrational (‘emotional’) interference with rational processes by arational 
means (eloquence, sarcasm, wit, etc.), but rather a project of clearing away everything—be it a 
matter of feeling or reason—that prevents one from acknowledging plain moral truth.  
The mechanism of moral suasion is especially vivid when we consider the Fifth of July as 
Douglass’s declaration of his own membership in moral community before his predominately 
white (and predominately antislavery) audience. At the podium Douglass enacts eloquence, 
sarcasm, wit, mockery, mimicry, and, indeed at times, reasonableness; he brings his audience to 
feel (one must imagine) embarrassment and shame; he stands before his audience as a member of 
the moral community-- a fact that could only be denied through the most radical moral 
insensitivity. But it would be perverse to characterize what Douglass is doing as exhibiting 
marks and features and inviting his audience to infer that he is a member of the moral 
community, as if there were some gap between what he is doing at the podium and what 
constitutes membership in the moral community. Douglass is, rather, declaring himself a 
member of the moral community. Douglass is, at the podium, exercising his membership in such 
a way as to bring his audience to see what he is doing as such exercise. To stand before Douglass 
in this way is to already concede his membership in the moral community. Douglass short-
circuits the question of his standing by seizing the podium—to question whether Douglass has 
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the standing to do so amounts to a failure to recognize what Douglass is doing as the exercise of 
his membership in moral community. What remains is to bring his audience to see that what he is 
doing is such exercise—it is not a matter of justifying such exercise by appeal to something 
beyond the exercise itself. In declaration, Douglass thus takes a stance of insistence upon his 
membership in the moral community, rather than of inquiry. 
One might still ask, at this stage, whether Douglass is in fact refusing to be reasonable 
when he declares his membership in the moral community. After all, the claim that Black people 
are members of the moral community is a (decisive!) reason to abolish slavery and other 
institutions of white supremacy. 
But what is at issue in antebellum political discourse, Douglass thinks, is the claim that 
Black people are members of the moral community. According to Douglass (as noted above), not 
only slavery, but also the enslaved, are on trial before the court of public opinion. And slavery's 
advocate alleges that Black people are not members of the moral community because they lack 
the marks and features requisite for such membership. According to view on the role of 
reasonableness in emancipatory politics which Douglass targets, when faced with a challenge to 
his membership in the moral community, Douglass ought to 'argue and persuade more' with his 
'logic, reason, and words,' because, if he does so, he is likely to sway public opinion in his favor. 
But Douglass, for the reasons presented above, thinks that such a political strategy will not 
achieve its desired aims. Instead, in the face of denials of his membership in the moral 
community grounded in justificatory appeals to requisite marks and features, Douglass declares 
his membership without seeking to reasonably address the arguments the white supremacist 
advances in opposition. The central characteristic of declaration here is that it advances a stance 
while refusing to engage in a further procedure of justification-- through declaration Douglass 
marks where he will reason with slavery's advocate no further. This refusal, in turn, asks of his 
audience to understand why Douglass will reason with slavery's advocate no further: this is 
because there is no further fact which justifies Douglass's membership in the moral community, 
which he would have to evince in order to continue to reason with his interlocutor. In 
recognizing that there is no such further fact, Douglass's audience comes to recognize him as a 
member of the moral community-- to take Douglass's declaration as such is thus to take him as a 
member of the moral community.  
It is worth noting that Douglass's audience in the Fifth of July speech is generally 
composed of supporters of the antislavery cause. We can thus take Douglass as modelling for his 
audience what he thinks is a more effective discursive strategy for antislavery organizations. This 
strategy, moreover, plainly has implications for the structure of antislavery organizations. 
Douglass seizes the podium for himself; no white abolitionist can do this for him. A declaratory 
discursive strategy against white supremacy, then, depends centrally on capacities which only 
Black political actors can exercise-- white political actors cannot enact the membership in the 
moral community of Black political actors for them. Insofar as Douglass's audience incorporates 
the declaratory model he puts on offer, then, their organizations will be fundamentally structured 
around Black political agents, and thus Black political agency. 
Douglass thus sees common sense moral truths articulated by declarations as the ground 
for the discursive arm of a viable antislavery politics, because it offers an alternative to 
reasonable political deliberation on the fundamental matter of membership in moral community. 
In declaring his membership, and that of Black people, in the moral community, Douglass 
signals a refusal to subject the boundaries of moral community to the norm of reasonableness, 
motivating this refusal by pointing to the way in which the justifications for claims that he is 
excluded from moral community in fact presuppose his membership in the community. This 
suggests that the shape of the problem is a matter of recovery of common sense moral truth, 
rather than discovery of moral truths in need of determination by inquiry. Where the latter is 
epitomized in Taney’s question, “[W]hether the class of persons described in the plea in 
abatement compose a portion of this people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty?”, 
the former is epitomized in Douglass’s declaration, “The manhood of the slave is conceded.” 
b. Delany’s Objection 
Douglass’s discursive strategy depends upon a notion of moral common sense accessible 
through moral clarity, rather than deliberative inquiry. The resolution of certain questions, such 
as the boundaries of moral community, is a matter of leading others to a recovery of an insurgent 
common sense—i.e., of coming to see plain moral truths aright. Delany, at times, seems to share 
Douglass’s endorsement of antislavery politics grounded in common sense. In leveling his 
criticism of McLean’s jury instructions in Giltner v. Gorham,74 Delany appeals to what “moral 
philosophy teaches, as common sense dictates….” for “in the position assumed by Judge 
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McLean, common sense is set at naught, and philosophy at defiance.”75 The wrongness of 
McLean’s jury instructions is clear, according to Delany, from common sense reflection on plain 
moral truths. And, Delany thinks, McLean arrives at his morally noxious conclusion because he 
holds that plain moral truths cannot impinge upon the procedures of legal deliberation: 
“[McLean] did not once express his abhorrence of slavery, but modestly evaded commitment on 
that point, by simply saying, ‘Whatever may be our feelings,’ and so forth, ‘the law’ is thus and 
so.”76 Moreover, in his discussion of a natural claim to citizenship in Condition, Delany seems to 
have the makings of a declaratory strategy similar to the one Douglass models in his Fifth of July 
speech: as noted above, he describes such claims as 'invulnerable to annulment,' which suggests 
that such claims cannot be overturned through deliberative inquiry.    
But, for Delany, the lesson drawn from the critique of reasonableness is not that 
antislavery needs an alternative discursive strategy for short-circuiting the norm of 
reasonableness. Rather, the lesson is that the most viable antislavery strategy is emigration: 
Black people should leave the United States and form their own polity elsewhere.77 This lesson 
implies that a viable antislavery politics must, Delany thinks, ultimately withdraw from the 
sphere of antebellum US political discourse.  
While Delany does not offer an explicit rejection of Douglass’s alternative discursive 
strategy, we can piece together a criticism of Douglass’s strategy from Delany’s antebellum 
writings. Appeals to moral common sense cannot short-circuit the norm of reasonableness in 
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antebellum political discourse because the norm of reasonableness constrains the shape of 
intelligible political discourse. Douglass’s declaration thus cannot be heard by his audience but 
as a claim responsible to the norm of reasonableness. For Delany, this constraint on antebellum 
political discourse emerges most clearly in legal decisions such as Giltner v. Gorham. While 
what is wrong with McLean’s decision in this case is just that he refuses to address moral 
considerations external to the law, this same fact renders antebellum political discourse 
impervious to Douglass’s attempt at common sense intervention.   
We can bring Delany’s worry into view by considering a presupposition built into 
Douglass’s declarative strategy for establishing his standing in antebellum political discourse. In 
seizing the podium, Douglass exercises the capacities of a member of the moral community in 
order to compel his audience to recognize him as a member. This strategy crucially assumes that 
exercise of the capacities relevant to membership in the moral community does not depend on 
recognition of an agent’s standing to exercise those capacities, which itself turns on recognition 
of membership in the moral community.  
But, in some contexts, the exercise of capacities does seem to depend on recognition of 
an agent’s standing to exercise them. For example, in at least some legal contexts, one has the 
capacity to sue in virtue of having her standing to sue recognized by the relevant authority.78  
This is a point especially salient in legal discourse at the time Douglass and Delany are writing. 
In Scott v. Sanford, Scott is deprived of the capacity to sue because he lacks the standing to do 
so. Scott lacks the standing to sue because the Court determines that he is not a citizen of the 
United States. It would not have been intelligible to the Court for Scott to maintain that he is a 
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citizen of the United States because he has the capacity to sue. Scott’s assertion that he is able to 
sue would be understood as a claim in need of justification by appeal to his standing to do so—
insisting before the Court that he has the capacity to sue when his standing is challenged would 
beg the question.  
The Delany-inspired worry here is that the court of public opinion will understand 
whatever capacity Douglass invokes to establish his membership in the moral community as 
dependent on standing in this second way. If so, then Douglass’s audience will think that 
Douglass has the capacity to make moral demands on members of the moral community only if 
he has the standing to make such demands. Because the capacities in question are those exercised 
by members of the moral community, whether one has the standing to exercise them depends on 
whether one is a member of the moral community. But then it will appear to Douglass’s audience 
that he claims to be a member of the moral community because he is exercising capacities that 
only those who are members of the moral community are capable of exercising. His audience 
will then insist that he is begging the question. 
The crucial moment here is that in which Douglass’s declaration that he is a member of 
the moral community becomes a claim, in need of justification, that he is a member. This 
transformation occurs because Douglass’s audience understands the capacities which Douglass 
purports (in their eyes) to exercise in making his declaration as capacities that depend on 
standing in the way that the capacity to sue depends on having the standing to sue: if one lacks 
standing, one lacks the capacity. Because some do deny that Douglass is a member of the moral 
community, and thus deny that Douglass has the standing to make moral demands on its 
members, the court of public opinion must determine whether Douglass has the capacity to make 
such demands by assessing the justification for this denial of standing. For Douglass to insist that 
he is a member of the moral community, and thus has standing, because he has the capacity to 
make moral demands on members of the community is, in the eyes of the court, to beg the 
question. This amounts to a reinsertion of the norm of reasonableness at the crucial moment: the 
exercise of the capacity must be justified by an appeal to standing, and the appeal to standing 
must be justified by further considerations that establish one as a member of the moral 
community. The problems of corruption of blood and undermined standing seep back in because 
Douglass’s audience can only understand what Douglass is doing in this way. 
For Delany, antebellum legal discourse in particular seems impervious to appeals to plain 
moral common sense. Delany denounces “litigation for protection a sham, and all judicial 
proceedings a farce, that should immediately be abolished,” since this imperviousness ensures 
that legal “combat between Liberty and Slavery in this country must always terminate in favor of 
the latter.”79  
One might respond on Douglass’s behalf that, while Delany’s argument might call for 
pessimism in the sphere of legal deliberation, this does not entail that Douglass’s strategy is 
compromised in the wider sphere of political deliberation— the ‘court of public opinion’ to 
which Douglass refers to is merely a metaphor.   
But Delany would insist that the metaphor of the ‘court of public opinion’ points 
precisely to the way in which the shape of antebellum political deliberation recapitulates the 
assumptions of antebellum legal deliberation:  
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[T]here are no people who ever lived, love [sic] their country and obey their laws as the 
Americans. Their country is their Heaven—their Laws their Scriptures—and the 
decrees of their magistrates obeyed as the fiat of God.80 
Delany’s observation is driven by remarks like McLean’s in Giltner v. Gorham, that “[i]n the 
law is found the only safe rule by which controversies between man and man can be decided.”81 
But if antebellum legal deliberation transforms declarations of moral common sense into claims 
in need of justification, then we should expect that a culture of political deliberation 
fundamentally informed by the shape of legal deliberation will also engage in such alchemy. If 
so, then attempts at the recovery of moral common sense by appeal to moral clarity will not be 
intelligible as such to most participants in antebellum political discourse. The environment of 
antebellum political discourse is inhospitable, on Delany’s view, to the recovery of moral 
common sense.  
5. Conclusion 
 In this paper, I have shown why Douglass and Delany think that the norm of 
reasonableness can actively undermine the aims of emancipatory politics, through the fixing of 
deliberative outcomes and the undermining of standing. I have shown that Douglass and Delany 
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draw different conclusions for the viability of alternative discursive strategies for emancipatory 
politics, which turn on their differing perspectives on the legibility of appeals to moral clarity 
and common sense in antebellum US legal and political discourse. 
 As the epigraphs to this paper should suggest, I think that Douglass’s and Delany’s 
critique of reasonableness presents a problem of urgency for us. The norm of reasonableness 
exerts great influence in our political culture (as Obama’s remarks illustrate), and we are 
confronted with attempts to narrow the boundaries of moral community that clothe themselves in 
appeals to this norm (as Flynn’s tweet reveals). But one might insist that white supremacy and 
chattel slavery in the antebellum US is far too ‘special’ and ‘distant’ of a case from which to 
draw any conclusion about what the norm of reasonableness can, or cannot, do for emancipatory 
politics animating our own moment.  
Even if we were to concede this point, one scholarly upshot of this paper is that we can 
partially explain Douglass and Delany’s divergent strategies for emancipatory politics in the 
1850s. As Gooding-Williams has observed, ever since Du Bois penned “Of Mr. Booker T. 
Washington and Others,”82 the typology of assimilationism (Douglass) and separatism (Delany) 
has served as the dominant framework in the history of African American political thought.83 
The dominance of this distinction can instill these categories with an aura which suggests that 
they are fundamental, as if one is first an assimilationist or a separatist, and that it is this 
commitment which informs the rest of one’s antiracist politics.  
The analysis of Douglass and Delany’s divergent responses to the critique of 
reasonableness above helps to puncture this aura, and contributes to the “healthy skepticism” 
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Gooding-Williams advocates in response to attempts to schematize the history of African 
American political thought.84 In their political thought, Douglass and Delany’s shared point of 
departure is the question, “What kind of politics should African Americans conduct to counter 
white supremacy?”85 The degree to which their emancipatory politics approximate the Du 
Boisian ideal types of assimilationism and separatism follows from their assessments of the 
viability of particular political strategies. Douglass, for example, sees a strategy for pursuing 
emancipatory politics before the antebellum court of public opinion, while Delany denies that 
any such strategy is viable.86 Both see this domain of political discourse as one potential avenue 
for resistance, and both think that the norm of reasonableness which governs it presents a 
problem for resistance. But this then suggests that the point of emphasis should be on the 
assessments—for example, of the viability of pursuing antislavery politics in a sphere of 
discourse dominated by the norm of reasonableness—which will be just as dynamic as the 
political situation to which they correspond, rather than the static ideal types to which the 
assessments will correspond with varying degrees of ‘faithfulness.’87 
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86 The point here is not that the assimilationist stance is the default, and that one is a separatist 
insofar as one thinks ‘assimilationist’ strategies are not viable. This objection smuggles the 
categories back into the ground floor of the analysis. The point is that Douglass and Delany are 
both in the business of resisting white supremacy and slavery by whatever means they can make 
use of, and their assessments of the means that they can make use of differ.  
87 Take the trajectory of Delany’s political career: from antebellum separatist to major in the 
Union army to candidate for Lieutenant Governor in South Carolina to judge and back again to 
Framing Douglass and Delany’s critique of reasonableness in this way, moreover, makes 
clear how to respond to our objector. The question of how to resist white supremacy is still an 
especially urgent question for us, deliberation before our own court of public opinion is still an 
especially salient avenue for us, and the norm of reasonableness still governs conduct in the court 
of public opinion. In the face of calls for dialogue with those who advocate fear of members of 
our moral community as ‘rational,’ it is urgent for us to examine the extent to which the norm of 
reasonableness contributes productively to emancipatory political aims.   
In this connection, the interpretation of Douglass and Delany's antebellum political 
thought that I have provided here offers three central claims which should inform the 
emancipatory politics of our moment: 88 
1. Comporting oneself reasonably when engaging in political discourse with oppressive ideology 
can be counterproductive under conditions of substantial oppression. Reasonable engagement 
with oppressive ideology opens the way for proponents of such ideology to (a) manipulate 
deliberative inquiry into the ideology's claims and (b) undermine the standing of political actors 
targeted by the ideology. 
2. To the extent that a viable emancipatory politics must engage in the political discourse of its 
community, we should consider strategies which short-circuit the problems posed by comporting 
oneself reasonably in the face of oppressive ideology. Douglass's (relative) optimism on the 
possibility of advancing antislavery in the US is grounded, in part, in the alternative discursive 
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strategy of declaration: the insistence upon one's membership in a community, with the aim of 
bringing one's audience to recognize one's membership (as opposed to bringing one's audience to 
affirm justifications for one's membership). 
3. One important constraint on the viability of alternative discursive strategies for an 
emancipatory politics is the extent to which such strategies will be intelligible to one's audience 
as alternatives to comporting oneself reasonably in the face of oppressive ideology. Delany's 
pessimism is grounded, in part, in the seeming inevitability that Douglass's audience will hear his 
declarations as claims in need of justification. Because reasonableness is a norm deeply 
engrained in our political culture, it is important to ask whether the norm is likely to distort a 
particular alternative discursive strategy that we may employ in advancing emancipatory 
political aims.  
 
 
